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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a consolidated appeal of the district court's orders revoking probation in
two separate (but related) criminal cases.

On appeal, Abraham Scragg ins contends

that the district court violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by
revoking his probation based on the very same violations for which he had already been
punished through the imposition of an intermediate sanction, i.e., ten days of
discretionary jail time. He requests that the district court's orders be vacated, and that
his case be remanded to the district court with an instruction that he be returned to
probation.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously set forth
detail in Mr. Scraggins' Appellant's Brief and, therefore, are not repeated herein.

1

In

ISSUE

Does the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permit a district court to
revoke probation for past violations which were previously punished through the
intermediate sanction of discretionary jail time?
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ARGUMENT
The Due Process Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment Does Not Permit A District
Court To Revoke Probation For Past Violations Which Were Previously Punished
Through The Intermediate Sanction Of Discretionary Jail Time
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Scraggins pointed out that, in Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), the United States
Supreme Court held that parolees and probationers are entitled to due process of law
(as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment) before their conditional liberty may be
revoked and they are sent to prison, and that no revocation may occur in the absence of
a finding of a violation of the conditions of parole or probation. (See Appellant's Brief,
pp.9-11.) Based on this authority, Mr. Scraggins went on to argue that due process
demands that the violation in question must be a new one, not previously sanctioned, in
order to trigger the court's authority to revoke parole or probation.
Brief, pp.11-14.)

(See Appellant's

In furtherance of this latter argument, Mr. Scraggins cited not only

Morrissey and Gagnon, but also a handful of cases from Oklahoma and Texas. (See
Appellant's Brief, pp.11-14.)
In response, the State offers a number of arguments which it contends support
its contention that Mr. Scraggins' due process rights were not violated. First, the State
argues that because neither Morrissey, nor Gagnon, specifically recognized the due
process right at issue in this case, no such right can exist. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.)
Second, the State claims that "Scragg ins' argument is essentially a double jeopardy
argument," and that such an argument necessarily fails. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8.)
Third, the State takes issue with Mr. Scraggins' contention that, in entering into a
probation agreement, the State makes an implied promise not to punish the probationer
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twice (through an intermediate sanction and revocation) for the same violation.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.)

Fourth, the State argues "Scraggins' position is

inconsistent with the principle that 'facts existing when the sentence was imposed as
well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of
probation' are all relevant to a revocation decision." (Respondent's Brief, p.9 (quoting
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27 (Ct. App. 2009».) Finally, the State attempts to

distinguish the Oklahoma and Texas cases cited in Mr. Scraggins' Appellant's Brief.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-11.) For the reasons set forth below, the State's arguments
are without merit.
The State's first argument in this case is that because neither Morrissey, nor
Gagnon, specifically recognized the due process right at issue in this case, no such

right can exist.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.)

Specifically, the State claims that a

defendant can only establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation by "proving a violation
of a recognized due process right, which in the probation revocation context would be
one of the six rights articulated in Morrissey."

(Respondent's Brief, p.7.) 1

This

argument, however, is frivolous. Not only did Morrissey specifically identify more than
six rights (see Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485-89), but it specifically held that the rights
identified therein were not the exclusive rights guaranteed by due process: "We cannot
write a code of procedure; that is the responsibility of each State. Most States have
done so by legislation, others by judicial decision usually on due process grounds. Our

1 When it refers to "the six rights articulated in Morrissey," the State is presumably
referring to the six rights, numbered (a) through (e), appearing at page 489 of the
Morrissey opinion.
(See Respondent's Brief, p.6 (block-quoting this portion of
Morrissey).)
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task is limited to deciding the minimum requirements of due process." Morrissey, 108
U.S. at 488 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Morrissey Court explicitly declined to decide
whether a "parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained counselor to appointed
counsel if he is indigent," as part of his due process rights, and it reserved that question
for another day.
The State's next argument is that Mr. Scragg ins' claim is "essentially a double
jeopardy argument," and that, as so characterized, it necessarily fails. (Respondent's
Brief, pp.7-8.) Further, the State complains that Mr. Scraggins has sought to "avoid
binding precedent simply by restating the same essential argument as a violation of due
process." (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) This argument is also frivolous. Mr. Scraggins has
not presented a double jeopardy argument under the Fifth Amendment; he has raised

his claim only as a due process issue under the Fourteenth Amendment. As such, his
claim must be evaluated under due process standards-even if those standards are not
favorable to the State.
Third, the State takes issue with Mr. Scraggins' contention that, in entering into a
probation agreement, the State makes an implied promise not to punish the probationer
twice (first, through an intermediate sanction of discretionary jail time and, later, through
revocation) for the same violation.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.)

In part, the State

complains that Mr. Scraggins has cited no authority for the proposition that such an
implied promise exists.

(Respondent's Brief, p.9.)

However, the State has cited no

authority for the proposition that such an implied promise does not exist. Moreover, the
probation agreement only makes sense insofar as such an implied promise is construed
to be part of that agreement.

Probation officers are often allowed to impose

5

exceptionally long periods of discretionary jail time (in this case, up to 180 days
(R., pp.67, 128; 6/10/10 Tr., p.13, L.11 - p.14, L.4)); there is little or no due process
governing probation officers' use (or abuse) of discretionary jail time (in this case, the
probation officer was required to immediately report to the district court (R., pp.67, 128;
6/10/10 Tr., p.13, L.11 - p.14, L.4); however, that did not happen (Letter from Lori Pino
to Judge Wetherell (Jul. 19, 2010))); and the defendant has no right to credit for the time
spent serving discretionary jail time, State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 8-9 (2002).

Under

these circumstances, to not find such an implied promise on the State's part would be to
say that discretionary jail time is subject to completely arbitrary and capricious
application. And, surely, this is not something that would be contemplated by the either
the State or the defendant. 2
The State's fourth argument is that Mr. Scraggins' position is inconsistent with
requirement that the district court evaluate the entire record in determining whether to
revoke probation; the State reasons that "[iJf Scraggins' argument is taken to its logical
conclusion, a court would never be able to consider anything other than the conduct that
resulted in the probation violation allegations .... " (Respondent's Brief, p.9.) This is
simply not true though.

As Morrissey makes clear, finding a parole (or probation)

violation and deciding to revoke parole (or probation) is a distinct two-step process.
Morrissey, 408 at 483-84 ("This discretionary aspect of the revocation decision need not

be reached unless there is first an appropriate determination that the individual has in

As noted in Mr. Scraggins' Appellant's Brief (p.4), according to Mr. Scraggins'
probation officer, the discretionary jail time in this case was supposedly imposed "[i]n
lieu of filing a report of violation .... " (Letter from Lori Pino to Judge Wetherell (Jul. 19,
2010).)
2
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fact breached the conditions of parole."). Mr. Scraggins' arguments in this case go to
the first step. It is Mr. Scragg ins' contention that, under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it takes a new probation violation to trigger the district court's
authority to revoke probation. Thereafter, assuming this precondition has been met, it
would be well within the district court's authority to consider the entire record in deciding
whether to actually revoke probation. Accordingly, Mr. Scragg ins' position is in no way
in conflict with existing precedent.
The State's fifth and final argument is that the Texas and Oklahoma cases cited
by Mr. Scraggins are neither relevant, nor persuasive. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-11.)
Because these cases stand on their own merit, nothing more need be said about them
herein. Mr. Scraggins would point out, however, that the State has not countered the
Texas and Oklahoma cases with any authority suggesting that a probationer can be
subjected to an intermediate sanction of discretionary jail time, and then have his
probation revoked, based on the very same probation violations.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Scraggins respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's October 18,
2010 orders revoking his probation, and that it remand his case with an instruction that
he be returned to probation.
DATED this 28 th day of December, 2011.

/2
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ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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